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The government has proposed providing law enforcement officials with unprecedented
access to internet communications. Joss Wright  argues that this amounts to a hugely
expensive and invasive scheme that will have only minimal effectiveness in achieving its
stated goals.
The means through which we communicate have undergone dramatic changes in recent
decades. Mobile phones and Skype have largely superseded tradit ional telephones,
emails are sent in place of  letters and postcards, much of  our news and inf ormation
comes f rom websites and search engines, and technologies such as instant messaging, SMS, Facebook
and Twitter are thriving in communication niches that barely existed twenty years ago. These changes
have brought new opportunit ies and means of  organising, both f or legit imate and nef arious purposes. It
is in the context of  these advances that the coalit ion government has proposed to revive Labour’s
abandoned Interception Modernisation Programme, rebranded as the ‘Communication Capabilit ies
Development Programme’ or CCDP. Put brief ly, the CCDP has been presented as a means by which law
enf orcement and intelligence agencies are to expand their capabilit ies to monitor all f orms of  online
communications. In doing so the scope of  what will be intercepted and analysed, and the inf rastructure
required to support such surveillance, is to be massively extended. There are numerous objections to
these proposals, based on the limited inf ormation to which we have access, and I will attempt to address
the more signif icant of  these.
One of  the most worrying objections lies not in the proposals themselves, but instead in the lack of
transparency that surrounds them. Despite the sweeping nature of  the changes that have been implied,
extremely litt le detailed inf ormation regarding the implementation of  the policy has been revealed to the
public. This has f orced civil liberties campaigners, such as those who attended the recent LSE-hosted
‘Scrambling f or Saf ety’ event, to extrapolate f rom the stated aims of  the new proposals, f rom details of
previous and existing schemes, and f rom known technologies. This has led, inevitably, to accusations
f rom proponents of  the CCDP that any crit icisms are unf ounded scaremongering.
When we examine what has been said about the newly-revived proposals, the most notable aspect of
the rhetoric, as with earlier proposals under Labour, is the assertion that they are nothing new. Instead,
we are repeatedly told, these programmes are merely a means by which law enf orcement and intelligence
services can ‘maintain’ or ‘preserve’ existing capabilit ies required f or f ighting terrorism. If  our phone
records are already subject to monitoring, what possible objection could there be to extending this to
details of  emails, web pages, social media, and Skype?
This argument relies on a f undamental misconception. Despite any superf icial similarit ies between old
and new communication technologies, it is both disingenuous and dangerously simplistic to consider
access to phone records as a usef ul analogy f or making policy about combined access to email, web,
social media and other internet traf f ic. The extent to which we use these new services is vastly greater,
the inf ormation that they reveal about our habits and interactions greater still. This is f urther amplif ied by
the ease with which these separate records can be correlated and cross-ref erenced. A closer analogy
than logging telephone calls is the noting of  every conversation we have, every book or newspaper
article that we read, every shop that we visit and what we buy, as well as a host of  other interactions that
together make up a f righteningly detailed picture of  our lif e and habits.
Proponents are quick to point out that the content of  our communications will not be subject to scrutiny;
only ‘communications’ data will be logged. This includes details such as the name of  websites, the sender
and recipient of  emails, and the time at which communications took place. This detail is of ten presented
to alleviate concerns that the proposed monitoring would be in any way invasive. This, again, is either
intentionally misleading or dangerously misinf ormed, f lying as it does in the f ace of  many decades of
research and application of  traf f ic analysis — the inf erence of  details purely f rom patterns of
communications. As the proposals themselves show, this technique is considered to be a powerf ul tool
in analysing individuals f or criminal or terrorist activity. It is equally powerf ul and revealing about our own
daily habits, and presents a deep and unacceptable intrusion into our right to a private lif e.
Neither is it true that communications data is simple to dif f erentiate f rom the content of  communications.
In modern online services the distinction between communication and content has blurred to an extent
that can of ten leave it meaningless. This can be demonstrated with the example of  visit ing a website: it is
easy to see that the URL ‘google.com’ is distinct f rom the page of  search results that you see when
querying the site. In reality, however, a Google search f or ‘government surveillance’ will result in a URL
more akin to ‘http://www.google.com/search?q=government+surveillance’. With the search terms, and
potentially other identif ying inf ormation, so prominently highlighted, should this be considered
communication or content data?
In f act, this battle was f ought and won by the Foundation f or Inf ormation Policy Research in 2000, with
an amendment to the Regulation of  Investigatory Powers Act to limit communications data to the f irst
slash (‘/’) in URLs, revealing only ‘google.com’ and discarding all other inf ormation. While this seems an
easy distinction, the situation is complicated in many current services, including Google and Facebook, in
which all interactions take place through the website. If  this distinction between communication and
content data is upheld, it would prevent monitoring of  anyone communicating via Gmail or Facebook
messages, unless the companies themselves provide internal access f or monitoring. It theref ore seems
likely that, in the interests of  ‘maintaining current capabilit ies’, any such restrictions would necessarily be
repealed or bypassed.
Returning to a f amiliar point of  contention, there is much concern over the treatment of  encrypted
communications. Many modern services, again including Google and Facebook, use encrypted
connections by def ault f or purely practical security reasons. In order to gain meaningf ul communication
data regarding, f or example, messages between Facebook users, monitoring equipment will have to be
installed within the organisation itself . This raises a vast range of  questions concerning jurisdiction,
oversight, cost and compliance: who will pay f or this monitoring equipment, who will install and maintain it,
who will ensure its correct and legal use, and how will individual companies respond to such compulsion?
These concerns were recently dismissed by the Home Secretary, in answer to a question f rom the Home
Af f airs Select Committee, as ‘a technical detail’.
The costs and benef its of  such a scheme are, of  course, serious considerations. The earlier
Interception Modernisation Programme was projected to cost £2bn over ten years, and experience with
government IT programmes suggests that the f inal cost is likely to be much higher. More seriously, the
scheme will not be ef f ective in identif ying criminal or terrorist activity due to the inevitable inaccuracies
and misclassif ications that arise f rom analysing populations on a national scale; the sheer volume of
data simply overwhelms the analysis. This is not a limitation on current technology that can be solved
with f aster computers and larger databases, but the inevitable result of  analysing vast quantit ies of  data.
Such a system would, it is true, present insight into the activit ies of  those who are already under
suspicion but would be largely useless f or identif ying threats, and would do so only at the cost of
providing equally invasive details on the entire population. Controlling access to this inf ormation would
be impossible, as we see f rom existing data breaches and abuses. We are theref ore presented with a
hugely expensive and invasive scheme that will have only minimal ef f ectiveness in achieving its stated
goals, but be a serious risk to our privacy.
As with all such schemes, the proposed regime of  surveillance presents a grave risk of  use and abuse
beyond their stated purpose. Deep packet inspection, or DPI, equipment of  the type required by the
CCDP inherently possesses the capability to monitor both content and communications data, and will
necessarily be installed on a vast scale. That only the appropriate data will be accessed relies purely on
guarantees that are impossible to verif y, and that cannot be guarded against changes in policy or
institutional misuse. We have only to recall local councils abusing RIPA powers  to check if  parents f ell
into appropriate school catchment areas to imagine the kind of  day-to-day abuses that are made
possible. Nor is it in any way an exaggeration to compare the inf rastructure that such surveillance
proposals require to those that were used recently to such devastating ef f ect in Syria — indeed, they
are likely to be the same pieces of  equipment, developed by the same Western companies.
While the above arguments have f ocused to some extent on technology and the risks that come with its
misguided application. A more important and f undamental argument, however, is that the proposed
approach f ollows and accelerates a worrying trend towards blanket and unwarranted surveillance of  the
population in the hope of  identif ying those who may commit crimes. With the wealth of  inf ormation
revealed by communications data, the appeal to a Home Secretary of  an algorithmic black box that can
magically identif y terrorists is, perhaps, understandable, at least to those unf amiliar with the concept of
the base rate f allacy; such a view, however, violates the basic principle that individuals f or whom there is
no evidence or suspicion of  wrongdoing should not be targeted. Without this principle, where does the
surveillance and intrusion into our lives end?
There are many arguments against surveillance of  the type proposed in schemes such as the
Communication Capabilit ies Development Programme, and I have touched on only a f raction. In the past,
technical and economic f easibility, as well as compliance with EU law, have proved some of  the most
powerf ul of  these arguments, and they will remain so. Despite this, I believe that our arguments should
stem f irst and f oremost f rom the f act that blanket and unwarranted surveillance of  the population is
deeply wrong, both in terms of  our f undamental human rights and in our most basic values as a society.
Until that argument is won we will never see the end of  these misguided and damaging proposals.
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